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The science of system safety provides a structured guideline for managers to 
follow in order to ensure safe operations, but it does not ensure against deviations from 
such guidelines.  This responsibility lies with management.  Engineering managers must 
be able to dictate and track safety requirements throughout product development, 
deployment, and operation by treating system safety as an integrated engineering 
discipline.  It is not feasible to expect the technical teams to integrate safety into designs 
unless safety requirements are considered a design metric just as cost and performance.  
Therefore, the traditional method of employing a separate safety department to address 
safety requirements is not sufficient.  This responsibility must be given to all technical 
departments and levied as a design requirement. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
One doesn’t have to search for very long to gain an understanding of the 
importance of system safety.  Take for instance the sinking of Titanic.  System safety was 
compromised during the design phase when engineers were forced to use low grade steel 
as opposed to the industry standard of the time [1].  Safety was again compromised 
during operations, on the day of the sinking, when communication between the radio 
room and the bridge broke down, binoculars were not present in the crow’s nest, and only 
20 lifeboats were present on a ship that was designed to hold 32 [1].  The consequence of 
this accident was 1500 people dead and loss of a $400 million asset (in today’s dollars).   
The Exxon Valdez oil spill is another example of the importance of 
uncompromising system safety principles.  As was the case with Titanic, system safety 
was bypassed during both the design and operations phases of the Exxon Valdez 
program.  First, during the design phase it was decided that the ship would be designed 
with a single hull.  At the time, it was common for oil carrying ships to have a double 
hull design to minimize the loss of oil and reduce the environmental impact in the event 
of an accident.  Proper system safety principles would call for a double hull design as a 
risk mitigation measure to protect the integrity of the ship when exposed to the hazards 
present in the shipping lanes off the coast of Alaska.  If management had given proper 
consideration to the consequences of an oil spill on the environment, it would have been 
clear that a double hull design was necessary.  As far as operations go, at the time of the 
spill the shipmaster was sleeping off a hang-over while the Third Mate attempted to 
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maneuver the ship through the precarious shipping lane off the coast of Alaska.  The 
shipmaster suffered from alcoholism and had been through treatment for the disease, but 
Exxon management did not monitor whether or not he abstained from alcohol abuse 
following in-patient treatment [2].  Furthermore, the National Transportation Safety 
Board found that Exxon management was not in contact with the hospital that 
administered treatment before, during, or after the shipmaster was admitted, even though 
the physician recommended follow-up treatment.  Without monitoring the shipmaster’s 
conduct there was no way that management could have verified that the he was not 
abusing alcohol following his release from the hospital.  While the Shipmaster was under 
the influence the Third Mate had to take control of the ship but was not given the proper 
6 hours time off-duty before beginning a 12 hour shift [2].  The allotted time off between 
shifts is a risk mitigation measure in place to assure that the operator is not a hazard to the 
ship.   
The consequences of Exxon Valdez accident in terms of environmental impact are 
difficult to estimate, but could certainly be argued as nothing short of catastrophic.  The 
monetary consequence to Exxon was $30 million lost to repair the ship, $2.2 billion for 
clean-up, and another $1 billion in state and federal settlements.  Clearly, the 
predetermined safety measures regarding ship design, human factors (i.e. proper rest for 
personnel), and proper safety tools (i.e. on board radar system) were either compromised 
or neglected by management.  The science of system safety seeks to identify these 
hazards and establish measures to reduce the risk of a mishap, but these measures must be 
adhered to and verified by management in order to be effective. 
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When considering human spaceflight, NASA has firsthand experience of the 
consequences of a mishap due to poor safety management.  The importance of system 
safety is put into perspective when considering the Challenger accident, that ended the 
lives of seven brave astronauts and cost the county $12 billion [3], or the Columbia 
accident that took the lives of seven more astronauts and cost the country another $13 
billion.  The accident investigation boards for both accidents found that deficiencies in 
system safety were to blame.  Following the Challenger accident Ronald Reagan 
appointed the Roger’s Commission to investigate the incident and document the 
contributing factors.  The Commission found four factors that related to deficiencies in 
system safety, including “a lack of problem reporting requirements, inadequate trend 
analysis, misrepresentation of criticality, and lack of involvement in critical discussions 
[4].”  The report identified serious flaws in the decision making process, such as the 
waiving of launch constraints by management without technical oversight or approval.  
Launch constraints are carefully determined long before the day of launch to ensure that 
the shuttle is not launched in an unsafe condition.  In the case of the Columbia accident, 
the report found that “the NASA organizational culture had as much to do with the 
accident as the foam” [2].  Organizational culture, which is determined by top 
management, will be discussed further in Chapter 5.  The simple fact is that both of these 
accidents could have been prevented with proper attention to system safety principles.  
While the direct cause of these accidents was technical failure, both accident 
investigations point out deficiencies in system safety as the underlying causes.     
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System safety principles can be applied to any technology driven product, or 
process, comprising complex integrated facets.  Generally speaking, management plays a 
large role in system safety, and the prevention of safety related accidents.  The science of 
system safety provides a structured guideline for managers to follow in order to ensure 
safe operations, but it does not ensure against deviations from such guidelines.  This 
responsibility lies with management.  Management, in this case refers to all levels of 
management including top management, project management, functional management, 
and systems engineering management.  The accidents mentioned herein are all cases 
where management failed to adhere to predetermined system safety measures, resulting in 
the ultimate cost for those who perished, and significant monetary cost to the responsible 
organizations.  Moreover, all of these accidents were preventable with proper attention to 
system safety practices. 
1.1.HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON SYSTEM SAFETY 
System safety was introduced after World War II primarily because of public 
concerns over the safety of nuclear power, aviation, and the chemical industry [6].  
Leveson explains how the introduction of technological advancements within the nuclear 
power, commercial aircraft, and chemical industries were conservative while defense and 
space industries pushed the envelope with more aggressive introduction of advanced 
technologies.  The Atlas and Titan ballistic missiles are perfect examples of early on 
technology aggressive programs that did not implement system safety standards, resulting 
in unforeseen interface problems and low launch success rates [6].  Between the span of 
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1952 to 1966 the USAF had significant issues with system safety.  During this time 7715 
aircraft were lost to accidents where 8547 persons perished [7].  It was because of these 
problems that system engineering and system safety really became accepted as a crucial 
facet of both the development and operations phases of the product life cycle.  “The 
system safety concept was not the invention of any one person; rather it was a call from 
the engineering community, contractors and the military to design and build safer 
systems and equipment by applying a formal proactive approach” [8].  In 1946 Amos L. 
Wood presented “The Organization of an Aircraft Manufacturer’s Air Safety Program,” 
as the first formal mention of system safety principles [8].  In his presentation, Wood 
describes the need for safety in design, accident investigation, safety education, accident 
preventative designs, and statistical analysis [8].  This school of thought represents early 
advancements in system safety and the idea of failure analysis to assess risk.  
Additionally, Wood is the first to realize that safety must be considered throughout the 
entire life of the project and not implemented as an afterthought. 
“Engineering for Safety,” by William I. Stieglitz is another important piece in the 
history of system safety [8].  Stieglitz was ahead of his time with a call for safety as a 
specialized discipline and a product design metric.  For instance, it wasn’t until 2002, 
when NASA implemented the 2nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle program that the 
agency began to consider safety and reliability as a level 1 requirement [9].  Leveraging 
the writings of Wood and Stieglitz, system safety really developed through accident 
investigation and lessons learned.  As lessons were learned from early missile tests, 
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government agencies began to pick up system safety programs.  Ericson’s review of 
formal system safety procedures and relevant milestones are shown in Table 1 [8].   
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Table 1: Formal System Safety Procedures and Relevant Milestones [8] 
Year Milestone 
1950 USAF Directorate of Flight Safety Research (DSFR) established at Norton Air Force Base 
1955 Navy Safety Center established 
1957 Army Safety Center established 
1960 Formal system safety organization established at Redstone Arsenal 
1960 System safety office established at USAF Ballistic Missile Division 
1961 MIL-S-23069 “Safety Requirement, Minimum, Air Launched, Guided Missiles” released 
1963 USAF released MIL-S-38130 “Safety Engineering of Systems and Associated Subsystems and Equipment: General Requirements For.” 
1966 MIL-S-38130 Rev A released 
1969 MIL-STD-882 “System Safety Program for Systems and Associated Subsystems and Equipment: Requirements For” 
 
MIL-STD-882 has evolved over the years into a performance-oriented standard 
that serves as the basis for most system safety programs, in both the military and private 
sector.  The current version of the specification is MIL-STD-882D, “Department of 
Defense Standard Practice for System Safety” [10].  In the document the standard is 
described as a tool to manage the risk of environmental, safety, and health mishaps.      
At the same time system safety principles were evolving in the military, the 
private sector and academia were also beginning to recognize system safety as an 
engineering discipline.  In 1963, the Aerospace System Society was established, and from 
1964 to 1965, system safety programs were created at the University of California, and 
the University of Washington [8].  The first system safety program plan was developed 
for the Minuteman program by The Boeing Company in December of 1960 [8].  All of 
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the historical information points to the evolution of MIL-STD-882 as the main carrier of 
advancements in system safety from its initial release in 1969 to the present version 
released in January of 2000. 
1.2.  MODERN SYSTEM SAFETY 
System safety experts are noticing that traditional system safety techniques are 
fast becoming insufficient in their ability to produce safer systems [11].  Current system 
safety models rely heavily on past experiences.  That is, failure data is gathered over the 
life of a program and statistical models are generated to determine the probability of a 
failure occurring in the future.  This philosophy holds only if the historical data is 
accurately represents the system being analyzed.  With rapid technological advancement 
the reliability based data that system safety engineers use to predict hazard probability are 
often not directly applicable.  Additionally, most aerospace organizations, such as NASA 
and Boeing, employ a separate safety group that is in charge of reviewing designs with 
respect to safety and ensuring safety requirements are met.  It will be shown that a 
paradigm shift in the way organizations treat safety is needed to keep up with the rapidly 
advancing technologies within the aerospace field.  While system safety is an evolving 
science that is struggling to keep up with industry, seven basic principles of system safety 
that have remained constant [7]: 
1. System safety is built into the design, and not implemented as an afterthought 




3. System safety looks beyond failure based hazards and attempts to identify all 
hazards inherent in the system 
4. System safety relies on analysis rather than experience and standards 
5. System safety uses a qualitative approach 
6. System safety recognizes tradeoffs and conflicts 
7. System safety is not just system engineering 
Organizations must develop a system safety plan than satisfies these seven 
principles.  Roles of management in the development and execution of the safety plan, 
and the consideration that must be given with regard to the seven basic principles is 
analyzed with respect to the following system safety topics: 
1. Systems and Systems Engineering 
2. Engineering Management Roles in Product Development 
3. Hierarchical Structure of Safety Control 
4. Organizational Culture 
Through analysis of these topics and current system engineering practices within 
the aerospace industry it will be shown that safety must be considered throughout the 
project life cycle as a design metric equal in merit to cost, performance, and schedule.  In 
order to achieve this goal, safety requirements must be taken away from a separate safety 
group and levied on the functional groups to be implemented, not only during operations, 
but during the design phase as well.  Additionally, the tracking of hazards and residual 
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risk must remain with functional groups where the technical expertise of the group can be 
utilized to ensure hazards have been properly identified and mitigated.    
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Chapter 2: Systems and Systems Engineering 
This section examines the system safety engineering practices of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as a means to demonstrate how system 
safety fits within the systems engineering framework.  Therefore, the system and system 
safety engineering models presented in this chapter are taken from the NASA Systems 
Engineering Handbook [12], and the NASA General Safety Program Requirements 
document [13].  These models are chosen because of their maturity.  “Since the writing of 
NASA/SP-6105 in 1995, systems engineering at [NASA], within national and 
international standard bodies, and as a discipline has undergone rapid evolution.  Changes 
include implementing standards in the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) 9000, the use of Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute’s Capability 
Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) to improve development and delivery of products, 
and the impacts of mission failures [12].”  Additionally, through investigation of the 
Space Shuttle Challenger and Columbia system safety accidents improvements were 
identified and implemented, resulting in tested and validated system engineering 
principles for aerospace applications.  For these reasons, the NASA systems engineering 
process is one of the most mature and well documented processes available to the public.  
The systems engineering (SE) overview is presented to illustrate how the system safety 
engineering models need to be integrated within the overall SE process to achieve a safe 
system, which is one that meets the predetermined safety goals of the project.  Recall that 
the first of the seven basic principles of system safety is that system safety is more than 
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just systems engineering.  Engineering managers must be able to track safety throughout 
product development, deployment, and operation.  This is achieved by treating system 
safety as an integrated engineering discipline within the SE model.  This section includes 
the definition of a system and examines the NASA system engineering framework.  The 
NASA system engineering framework is broken down into the three major processes of 
system design, product realization, and technical management.  System safety is a 
technical discipline within the technical management umbrella, but it will become 
apparent that all aspects of the systems engineering process are connected in one way or 
another. 
2.1 DEFINITION OF A SYSTEM 
According to the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, a system is “a construct 
or collection of different elements that together produce results not obtainable by the 
elements alone…elements or parts can include people, hardware, software, facilities, 
policies, and documents [12].”  Breaking down the NASA definition can give further 
insight into what a system actually is.  The first element is people, representing all of the 
stakeholders involved in the development, manufacturing, testing, operation, and 
maintenance of the system.  Generally speaking, they are managers, engineers, 
technicians, operators, and customers of the product, and together they design, fabricate, 
operate, and manage the tasks required for the remaining elements of the system.   
A system can be something as large as the Space Transportation System (STS) or 
as small as an actuating valve in the STS Main Propulsion System (MPS).  In most 
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instances, a system is actually a collection of smaller systems, as is the case with the STS.  
Figure 1 shows a highly simplified hierarchical view of the STS.  The top level STS 
consists of the External Tank, Orbiter, and Solid Rocket Boosters.   Figure 1 shows the 
sub-system hierarchy for the Orbiter, but the External Tank and Solid Rocket Boosters 
are also broken down into sets of sub-systems.  Separating a product into smaller sub-
systems is how system engineers manage complex systems.  Each one of the sub-systems 
can be comprised of one or all of the elements listed in the NASA definition of a system.  
In the case of the STS, the sub-systems and their elements are combined to launch 50,000 
lbs of payload into low earth orbit, a feat that certainly could not be achieved by the sub-
systems or elements individually.  This illustrates the first part of the system definition; a 
collection of elements working together to achieve more than possible on an individual 
basis.  In the end, this is the true benefit of a system, but it requires an entire engineering 
discipline to manage, known as systems engineering. 
 
Figure 1: STS Simplified System Hierarchy [12] 
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2.2 DEFINITION OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (SE) 
The definition of SE in the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook is “…a 
methodical, disciplined approach for the design, realization, technical management, 
operations, and retirement of a system.”  Due to the complexity of modern systems it is 
becoming almost universally accepted that a systems approach is necessary for a 
successful project [14].  Eisner identifies seven key features of a systems approach: 
1. Follow a systematic and repeatable process 
2. Emphasize interoperability and harmonious system operations 
3. Provide a cost-effective solution to the customer’s problem 
4. Assure the consideration of alternatives 
5. Use iterations as a means of refinement and convergence 
6. Satisfy all user and customer requirements 
7. Create a robust system 
This paper will examine the SE engine defined by NASA to demonstrate how these seven 
principles are applied with a comprehensive SE approach.  The NASA SE engine 
framework consists of three technical processes: system design, product realization, and 




Figure 2:  NASA Systems Engineering Engine [12] 
 
The SE process is meant to be iterative and recursive, and applied at each phase of 
the product life-cycle.  NASA defines “iterative” as the “application of a process to the 
same product or set of products to correct a discovered discrepancy or other variation 
from requirements,” and “recursive” as “the repeated application of processes to design 
next lower layer system products or to realize next upper layer end products within the 
system structure [13].”  Another common model of the systems engineering engine is the 
V-model.  Shown in Figure 3, the V-model demonstrates the top-down approach in the 
system design process, the bottom-up approach in the product realization process, and the 
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technical management taking place between the two.  System safety can be thought of as 
a systems engineering specialty, such as reliability and maintainability, which takes place 
during the entire system engineering process and throughout the life cycle of the 
program.  Both of these models demonstrate the first of the seven principles of a systems 
engineering approach, and that is a systematic and repeatable process.    
 
Figure 3:  The System Engineering V-Model [15] 
 
The systems engineering V-model can be related to the product life cycle and the 
different safety analyses that take place during each phase.  The life cycle of any project 
has five major phases: conceptual design, development and test, production, operation, 
and disposal [16].  The NASA SE engine consists of 17 processes, which are broken 
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down into three categories: system design, product realization, and technical 
management. 
2.2.1 System Design Processes 
The system design process is divided into the two categories of requirements 
definition and technical solution definition.  This process calls for requirements from the 
top level of the system to flow down through the lower level sub-systems.  This takes 
place until the lowest products in the system are at a manageable state and can be 
purchased, fabricated, or reused.  During the system design process, a concept for the 
system materializes based on this flow of requirements from the top down.  Important 
product information is obtained from all of the stakeholders.  Generally, this information 
includes concepts of operations (CONOPS), intended uses, and anticipated product life 
cycle.  With this information technical requirements are established in the form of 
quantifiable, measureable, and succinct baseline technical requirements.  Examples of the 
types of requirements developed during this process are functional, performance, 
interface, environmental, reliability, and safety.  Once established, these requirements are 
organized hierarchically from the top level down, with the top levels being the customer 
requirements and the bottom levels representing the implementing organization 
requirements.  Top-level requirements are decomposed as far down as necessary in order 
to obtain basic system architecture and end product requirements.  Finally, alternative 
design solutions are defined and a trade study of the proposed designs leads to the 
selection of a final solution.  The chosen alternative is developed into a final design 
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solution ready for production, and system specifications are generated.   Using the 
customer’s requirements to develop alternative solutions during the system design 
process provides a means to converge on the most cost-effective solution that meets the 
customer’s needs. 
2.2.2 Product Realization Processes 
Since the SE engine is applied during all phases of the product life cycle, the 
product realization process could refer to the realization of paper studies, hardware, 
software, models, or the whole system.  This process is different than the system design 
process in that product realization is passed from the lowest level up.  The solution 
formulated during the system design phase is verified against the technical requirements 
at each level up the system tree, and finally validated against the CONOPS and other 
stakeholder needs.  Generally speaking, verification testing is meant to show that all of 
the approved requirements are met, while validation testing is meant to prove that the 
system can achieve the mission objectives described in the CONOPS.  The methods of 
tying requirements to system verification and validation are defined in the Technical 
Management process, discussed later.  The product realization process consists of three 
separate categories: design realization, evaluation, and product transition.  The product 
realization process framework is shown in Figure 4.  The framework clearly shows the 




Figure 4:  Product Realization Process [12] 
 
At each level, “product” could refer to individual components, lower level sub-
systems, or the full up system, depending on how the system hierarchy is defined, and at 
what point in the overall system the SE engine is being applied.  The Product Breakdown 
Structure (PBS) defines how the system is separated for implementation into the SE 
engine.  The iterative and recursive nature of SE process will eventually result in the 
integration of the top level system architecture.  During the product integration stage, the 
system engineer must define interfaces and interface characteristics, ensure compatibility 
across interfaces, integrate lower level products into upper level systems, and document 
interface characteristics.  These tasks culminate in an integrated product ready to be 
verified, validated, and transitioned to the next level or to the end-user.  The product 
realization process ensures that a robust system is designed by using iterations as a means 




2.2.3 Technical Management Processes 
The technical management process is comprised of four categories: technical 
planning, technical control, technical assessment, and technical decision analysis.  This 
takes place during the entire systems engineering process and throughout the life cycle of 
the product.  The technical management of the system serves as a means to connect the 
product requirements from system design process to product verification and validation 
from the product realization process.  Bridging the stakeholder and the derived technical 
requirements with product realization ensures that the system will, not only meet 
requirements, but perform as intended.  Without the technical management process, the 
project’s objectives cannot be met.  There are eight major tasks in the technical 
management process: technical planning, requirements management, interface 
management, technical risk management, configuration management, technical data 
management, technical assessment, and decision analysis, as shown in Figure 2.  These 
processes take place during one or all phases of the product life-cycle.  The technical 
management process is the “glue” that holds the project together.  It provides the CSE a 
means of emphasizing interoperability and harmonious system operations.  Without the 
technical management process none of the seven key principles of a systems approach 
could be realized.   
2.3 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND SYSTEM SAFETY 
 System safety is a subset of the Technical Management process, but it exhibits 
many of the same attributes of the system engineering process.  First, the system design 
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process seeks to identify stakeholder needs and requirements in order to develop 
alternative designs.  During this time system safety objectives are defined along with high 
level requirements with respect to safety.  A system safety plan is generated that 
encompasses the program safety goals, and serves as the basis for safety assessment 
throughout the development process.  In essence, the desired behavior of the system with 
respect to safety is defined by the safety plan.  As the design matures through the system 
design process, possible hazards are identified and safety controls are established to 
mitigate the risk of a mishap.  There are many types of controls that exist to mitigate risk.  
Design constraints, such as redundancy in critical components, can be built into the 
system to inhibit a hazard.  Engineers could also implement special processes to protect 
against a hazard.  An example of a risk mitigating process control is the maneuver that 
Third Mate on the Exxon Valdez was instructed to take in order to safely pass Bligh 
Reef.  When considering process controls, human interaction or automation could be 
used, both of which pose unique safety related hazards that system safety engineers must 
consider when assessing risk.  Management can also impart controls through 
organizational structure, company policy, and organizational culture.  In addition to 
management controls, there are outside controls such as government regulations and 
individual self-interest.  Management must be cognizant of these controls in order to 
ensure safety engineers are addressing all possible hazards, and outside influence from 




Chapter 3: Engineering Management Roles in Product Development 
It has been established that complex systems require a systems engineering 
approach to product development.  However, proper management of the system’s 
approach and project schedule, cost, and performance require active participation from all 
levels of management.  The most common problems that projects face can be derived 
from one or more levels of management failing to meet their responsibilities.  Whether it 
is poor planning, loosely defined requirements, inadequate technical skills, or a lack of 
corporate support, problems in product development originate at the top and, if not 
mitigated, can cause any project to fail to meet its predetermined goals.  Examining the 
responsibilities of management will later help to identify how system safety principles 
can be integrated into the processes and culture of an engineering firm.  The four levels 
of management discussed are project management, system engineering management, 
functional management, and corporate management.   
 
3.1  PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
The project manager (PM) is responsible for the overall project schedule, cost, 
and performance.  Project management is broken down into five process groups: 
initiating, planning, executing, monitoring and controlling, and closing [17].  The PM 
initiates the project by developing a project charter and identifying all of the project 
stakeholders.  The planning stage is where requirements are collected and project scope is 
defined.  The requirements and scope of the project are close coupled with the initial 
stages of the system engineering engine where customer needs are analyzed and top level 
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requirements are generated.  The PM needs this information to develop project schedule, 
define responsibilities, allocate resources, and estimate project cost.  Project execution 
takes place concurrently with the system engineering process.  The PM tracks project 
performance, schedule, and cost during the monitoring and controlling process, and 
reallocates resources as necessary to keep the project on track.  Finally, the PM closes out 
the project by finalizing all activities.  This paper is not intended to be a project 
management tool, but rather a means of identifying the responsibilities of the project 
manager with respect to system safety.  Chapter 4 will cover the correlations between 
project management and system safety.  In order to achieve this correlation it is necessary 
to identify some of the common problems in project management.  Problems are 
perceived in terms of three factors: schedule, cost, and performance, known as the “big 
three” of project and systems engineering management [14].  Eisner identifies seven 
common reasons why projects encounter problems: articulation of requirements, poor 
planning, inadequate technical skills, lack of teamwork, poor communication, insufficient 
monitoring of progress, and inferior corporate support.  These common problems can be 
translated to common problems in managing system safety, as well. Again, this idea will 
be explored further in Chapter 4.        
3.2 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT 
The number one responsibility of systems engineering management is to identify 
and develop a solution that meets the customer’s expectations.  This responsibility 
usually lies with the Chief Systems Engineer (CSE).  The CSE must establish a technical 
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approach, evaluate alternative designs, develop the preferred system architecture, 
implement a repeatable systems engineering process, manage the use of computer tools 
and aids, and serve as technical coach and team leader [14].  The CSE is the technical 
face of the project that attempts to create a suitable solution to the customer’s needs 
within the constraints prescribed by the project engineer.   
3.3 FUNCTIONAL MANAGEMENT\ 
The roles and responsibilities of the functional manager are dependent upon the 
organizational structure of the firm.  In a typical functional organizational structure, 
functional managers are responsible for management of resources in the various functions 
that the organization is divided into.  These functions could be engineering, 
manufacturing, marketing, etc.  The functional managers must continually prioritize 
projects and place resources where they are required the most.  This often makes it 
difficult for project managers to guarantee that the proper level of technical support is 
provided for their project.  Maintaining adequate technical skills and continuity of 
resource assignments is the main focus the functional manager.  This requires effective 
communication with project management to determine project goals, and corporate 
management to determine project priority.             
3.4 CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 
Functional managers, systems engineers, and project managers are all fulfilling 
the tasks necessary to meet the business goals defined by corporate management.  
Corporate management defines the course that the company is going to take in order to be 
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a viable business.  When it comes to projects, corporate management sets the 
organizational culture of the firm by taking relevant government and industry standards, 
regulations, and laws and developing company standards, policies, and resources.  It will 
be shown in Chapter 5 that organizational culture has a large affect on the success of 
system safety goals.   
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Chapter 4: System Safety Overview 
System safety is a systematic scientific approach that engineers use to 
characterize the risk of potential hazards.  Most traditional approaches to systems safety 
involve the identification and management of hazards and their associated risks by 
leveraging reliability data obtained during product development.   However, recent 
advancements in the field suggest that system safety needs to be an integral part of the 
system engineering process as a design metric that addresses personnel, equipment, and 
environmental safety [13].  Recall, the third of the seven basic principles of system safety 
is to look beyond failure based hazards and identify all hazards inherent in the system.  
This overview will detail the system safety process and identify the roles and 
responsibilities of management throughout.   
Before delving into the system safety process, it is necessary to define a few key 
concepts.  First, a hazard is defined as a “condition, event, or circumstance that could 
lead to or contribute to an unplanned or undesired event” [18].  Hazards represent the 
conditions by which a mishap can take place.  A mishap is “an unplanned event or series 
of events resulting in death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment 
or property, or damage to the environment” [10].  The NASA system safety requirements, 
as with most government and commercial methods, leverage MIL-STD-882 for a 
generalized system approach to hazard analysis.  It is the hazard-mishap relationship that 
constitutes the first major concept of system safety.  The second major concept is risk.  
Risk encompasses to the severity, probability, and impact of a mishap.  Together, hazard 
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analysis and risk assessment drive the system safety process.  System safety science will 
identify and classify the risk of hazards, it is up to management to determine the 
acceptable level of risk to the program.     
4.1  THE SYSTEM SAFETY PROCESS  
The core system safety process outlined in MIL-STD-882 consists of eight steps, 
shown in Figure 5.  Further examination of the eight steps reveals that system safety 
hinges upon hazard analysis and the characterization of risk.  Management plays a role in 
all eight steps of the system safety process.  Initially, it is up to the program manager and 
CSE to develop a system safety plan that addresses resource allocation and defines 
responsibilities.  The PM and CSE must consider the organizational structure of the 
company when determining these responsibilities.  The first item of the seven basic 
principles of system safety, listed in section 1.3, specifies that system safety must be built 
into the design, and not implemented as an afterthought.  This implies that the program 
manager must consider system safety from the beginning and attempt to create a 
comprehensive plan that dedicates resources and defines the safety culture within the 
project.  Organizational culture within the project is something that was found to be one 
of the major causes of the Space Shuttle Challenger and Columbia accidents, and will be 




Figure 5: System Safety Process as Defined in MIL-STD-882 [10] 
 
 The safety plan lays the groundwork for all the safety related tasks of the project.  
It specifies the hazard analysis tools that are to be implemented.  The following steps, 
identification of hazards, mishap risk, hazard mitigation, risk reduction, and risk 
verification, are generally the responsibility of the CSE.  However, constant 
communication between the CSE and the PM throughout these steps is required so that 
the PM can make informed decisions regarding the allocation of resources and 
acceptance of unavoidable, or unmitigated, risk.   
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Identification of hazards is the second step in the system safety process.  This 
constitutes a systematic approach to hazard analysis and a comprehensive assessment of 
lessons learned on previous projects.  Often times the system safety engineers will 
overlook the lessons learned on previous programs, and sometimes even neglect to learn 
from mistakes within the same program.  This was the case with the Shuttle accidents.  
Although technical malfunctions that lead to both accidents were noted ahead of time, 
they were deemed acceptable, and decision makers did not listen to experienced 
engineers nor did they acknowledge or address the unresolved problems [3].  The CSE 
must encourage safety engineers to learn from past experiences when attempting to 
identify all possible hazards.  During hazard identification the CSE must remember that 
hazards do not just exist at the component level.  The analysis must extend to the entire 
system, the second of the seven basic principles of system safety. 
 The third step in the system safety process is the assessment of mishap risk.  Risk 
is the premise behind the decisions that program management makes regarding safety 
related issues.  The assessment considers risk severity, probability, and impact.  NASA 
describes risk as a function of “triplets,” referring to an accident scenario, frequency of 
occurrence, and consequence [13].  Accident scenarios define the circumstances by 
which an accident might occur, while frequency is a characterization of the probability of 
an accident scenario occurring, and the consequence is the severity of the outcome.  The 
categorization of risk usually involves placing all the mishap risk scenarios on a risk 
matrix to determine whether or not the risk is too high or acceptable.  The likelihood and 
consequence classifications are pre-determined and the level of acceptable risk is decided 
 
 30 
during the planning stages.  Figure 6 shows the risk process card used by the International 
Space Station program management.  The vertical axis of the risk matrix is the likelihood 
while the horizontal axis is the consequence.  The metrics that define likelihood and 
consequence are clearly stated on the process card for easy reference.  The accident 
scenarios are categorized and placed on the risk matrix for evaluation.  There are 
thousands of accident scenarios for something as complicated as the space station, so 
categorization of mishaps is absolutely necessary.  It is also crucial that program 
management determine early in the program what level of risk is unacceptable.  Notice 
the risk matrix on the process card in Figure 6 has three colors.  Green represents low 
risk, yellow represents moderate risk, and red represents high risk.  Usually, there are 




Figure 6: International Space Station Risk Management Process Card [19] 
 
If an accident scenario is deemed acceptable, meaning the likelihood and 
consequence put the risk too high with respect to established safety goals, then mitigation 
measures are taken.  Identifying mitigation measures is the forth step of the system safety 
process and establishing the risk reduction approach is the fifth step.  It is up to the CSE 
to determine the risk classification of each hazard and identify mitigation measures to 
reduce the risk as necessary.  All programs are constrained by cost, schedule, and 
Risk MatrixRisk Likelihood Classification 




performance, so mitigation of all risk is typically not possible.  Risk that cannot be 
mitigated must be accepted by the PM.  The CSE identifies ways to reduce the risk of all 
credible accident scenarios, and presents those options to the PM along with the 
anticipated impact to cost, schedule, and performance.  The PM can then prioritize the 
scenarios based on all metrics and direct the CSE to reduce the risk of those scenarios 
that represent the highest risk with respect to the program goals.  Ways of reducing or 
mitigating risk include analysis, inspection, or testing.  Typically, inspection is the least 
expensive approach, while testing is the most expensive, and analysis is somewhere in 
between.  Design engineers propose which method is best to reduce risk, while system 
safety engineers scrutinize the proposed methods.  The CSE and PM must allow system 
safety engineers to evaluate the risk reduction methods; otherwise they could be 
accepting a plan that cannot deliver on what is promised.  This means that the PM must 
allocate the necessary resources for safety engineers to evaluate the plan, and the CSE 
must provide the safety engineers with the latitude to do their work.  Often times the facts 
that safety engineers provide can be uncomfortable to the PM and CSE as the safety 
related issues identified lead to cost and schedule constraints.  However, rather than 
accept the risk reduction plan at face value, the system safety engineer’s evaluation 
provides management with the piece-of-mind that the plan will work.  Once the risk 
reduction approach is established, the PM and CSE must work together to correlate the 
risk reduction approach with the planned testing of the system.  Planned testing of 
components, subsystems, or the full system, establishes the risk reduction verification 
criteria, and leads into the sixth step of the system safety process. 
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The sixth step of the system safety process is verification of risk reduction.  By 
this point all possible hazards have been identified, categorized, prioritized, and assessed.  
The risk of each hazard has been established and a plan has been created to mitigate high 
priority risks.    Verification is the process of showing that the controlling factors and 
mitigation rationale support the updated risk classification.  Hazard analysis, as with 
system engineering, implements a closed loop system approach.  Figure 7 shows the 
hazard control process, adopted from the NASA system safety requirements [13].  The 
sixth step ensures that the plan to mitigate, or reduce, the unacceptable risk is conducted.  
The risk reduction plan could include analysis, inspection, or testing.  Once the plan has 
been implemented, the risk classifications of the identified hazards are updated.  The 
Hazard Control Process illustrates the hazard-mishap relationship and the controls 
established to mitigate the mishap risk.  Controls could are the measures in place to 
reduce the likelihood of occurrence, or the measures in place to reduce the severity of 
occurrence. 
The next step is for management to review the updated risk, and either accept the 
residual risk and move forward, or return back to step four and attempt to further reduce 
unacceptable risk.  Once this iterative process is completed the residual risk is 
documented in a hazard report for tracking and monitoring purposes.  A hazard report 
contains the residual risk of hazards that could not be controlled or mitigated.  Elements 
of the report are the hazard description, cause, effect, risk, controlling factors, mitigation, 
and verification.  Notice, these elements stem from the tasks outlined in the system safety 
process.  The description is the generic hazard, such as a fire or explosion.  The causes 
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are the events or conditions that may result in a mishap, while the effects are the potential 
results of each cause.  The severity and likelihood of occurrence represent the risk 
associated with each cause.  Acceptable risk is established at the program level during the 
initial stages of the product life cycle.  The controlling factors and mitigations are the 
measures put into place that prevent the hazard from occurring, such as a fire repression 
system to control a fire hazard.  The hazard report documents the hazard control process 
shown in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: Hazard Control Process as Defined in NASA NPR 8715.3 [13]  
 
Not all hazards are contained within the hazard report.  Rather, the hazards that do 
not meet predetermined risk requirements of the program are those that are controlled by 
the hazard report.  For instance, on the STS program, NASA followed a model of “Fail 
Operational, Fail Safe (FO/FS) [20].”  In other words, the system was designed such that 
a single failure results in an operational vehicle that can still meet mission objectives, 
while a second failure results in a safe vehicle that can return the vehicle, crew, and 
payload home safely.   When the risk of a hazard condition did not meet the FO/FS 
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requirement, it was organized into the hazard report.  While the risk rationale for STS is 
FO/FS, the same system safety tools and principles apply for any organization, regardless 
of the predetermined risk requirements.  The PM must ensure that the project is following 
the predetermined safety protocols.  One of the underlying causes of the Challenger 
accident was the apparent disconnect between management and engineering.  Program 
management was under intense schedule pressure and had been isolated from the lower 
levels, and therefore was not properly informed of the booster o-ring hazard [21].   
The final step in the system safety procedure is to track hazards and residual risk.  
The hazard reports represent the primary tool for accomplishing this task.  The tracking 
of hazards and risk are mostly conducted throughout the operations phase of the project.  
As reliability and safety data is collected on system performance, the hazard analysis and 
risk assessments are updated.  Additionally, design changes during system operation are 
inevitable, and the CSE must be diligent in ensuring that the system safety process is 
conducted when those changes are made.   
An example of how a design change can affect system safety is the liquid 
hydrogen drain assist purge, activated late in the launch countdown, for the STS Main 
Propulsion System.  The drain assist purge is a gaseous helium purge that vacates liquid 
hydrogen propellant from the fill line just prior to launch initiation.  When the STS was 
initially fielded the helium purge was not in place, but added later during the operations 
phase of the system life cycle.  The purge entry point is adjacent to the orbiter on the 
facility side of the orbiter outboard fill and drain line isolation valve (PV11).  The 
inboard fill and drain isolation valve (PV12) is closed during this operation, as well as the 
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orbiter replenish valve, but PV11 is open.  This essentially opens a path for the helium 
gas to enter into the orbiter fill and drain line, an 11 foot long 8 inch diameter pipe on the 
orbiter.  The purge starts at approximately T-98 seconds in the count sequence and lasts 
for 90 seconds.  PV11 closes 50 seconds into the purge, isolating any gas that was present 
in the orbiter fill and drain line.  PV12 is adjacent to the main feed line for the SSME 
during ascent, and it has a relief valve that will relieve gas into the main feed line if the 
pressure in the line goes above a certain pressure.  This is the nominal operation of the 
valve to prevent the over pressurization of the fill line.  When the purge was added, the 
hazard analysis did not identify the fact that the gas in the fill line could be helium, which 
if relieved into the SSME feed line could result in cavitation of the high pressure turbo 
pump and catastrophic failure.  The STS went through several launches without 
addressing this potential hazard.  This is just one example illustrating the need for the 
CSE to be diligent in updating hazards continually throughout the product life cycle.  
Additionally, program management must provide the CSE with the resources to 
continually update the hazard analysis. 
4.2 LOOKING BEYOND FAILURE BASED HAZARDS 
During various phases of the product life cycle different hazard analysis 
techniques are implemented and the tools to characterize the hazards in each phase also 
differ.  However, the basic premise behind the system safety process is still based on 
failure scenarios and supported with reliability data.  However, complex systems can 
pose hazards that are not just failure based.   
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With most system safety programs, accident scenarios are defined through failure 
analysis.  That is, analysis is conducted based on reliability data that identifies the 
probability of a component, or sub-system, failure.   In his book, Hazard Analysis 
Techniques for System Safety [16], Ericson describes seven different hazard analysis 
processes that must take place during the various phases of product development and 
operation to ensure that all hazards are identified, and not just failure based scenarios.  
The seven hazard analysis types are: 
1. Conceptual design hazard analysis 
2. Preliminary design hazard analysis 
3. Detailed design hazard analysis 
4. System design hazard analysis 
5. Operations design hazard analysis 
6. Health design hazard analysis 
7. Requirements design hazard analysis 
The hazard analysis types can be thought of as filters that gradually mitigate, or 
establish controls for, all hazards that could be encountered throughout the product life 
cycle.  Recall, controls are the measures in place that verify the risk classification of the 
hazard.  The hazards that are not controlled or mitigated represent the residual risk to the 
program and are usually compiled into hazard reports that are monitored and updated 
throughout the operations phase of the program.  There are many tools available to 
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conduct these hazard analyses, but they all can be classified into two basic techniques—
inductive and deductive. 
 The system safety process uses various inductive and deductive techniques, that 
complement one another, to make certain all safety Performance Measures (PM) are 
achieved.  Some of the tools commonly used, which can generally be categorized as 
failure based analysis techniques, are Fault Tree Analysis, Failure Modes Effects 
Analysis (FMEA), and Critical Items Lists (CIL).  FTA is a deductive approach where 
“conclusions are drawn from a set of premises and contains no more information than the 
premises taken collectively.” [16]. For instance, on the STS there is a hazard scenario 
where contaminates in the fuel could result in shutdown or catastrophic failure of the 
main engines.  FTA seeks to identify the premises that would allow contaminates to enter 
into the fuel supply, such as a leaking valve that allows a foreign gas to enter the fuel 
feed line.  The deductive reasoning is: the main engine could explode because of fuel 
pump cavitation; the fuel pump could cavitate if helium gas enters the fuel supply; and 
helium gas could enter the fuel supply through a leaking valve.  FTA is considered a top-
down approach, as shown in this example.  FMEA is a bottom-up approach and an 
example of an inductive hazard analysis technique, where “a conclusion is proposed that 
contains more information than the observation or experience on which it is based [16].”  
FMEA is a reliability tool used during design to identify what components can fail, how 
they can fail, how often, and with what consequences.  This information is in turn used to 
assess the overall reliability of the system.  Through inductive and deductive analysis 
techniques designers seek to identify all possible hazards and assess the probability of 
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occurrence.  The probability component or sub-system failures can be assessed with life-
cycle testing of the component of sub-system.  The deficiency with these types of 
analyses is that they may not adequately identify hazards that are not based on a failure 
scenario.   
An example of a non-failure based hazard is a system hazard.  A system hazard is 
a scenario where the system enters into a hazardous state without a failure.  An example 
of a system failure is the Comair flight 5191 accident [22].  The accident occurred 
because the aircraft lined up to takeoff from the incorrect run way, while the crew was 
under the assumption that they were in the correct position for takeoff.  Comair 5191 is 
an example of how inadequately controlled human factors can cause an accident.  
“Accident models that rely largely on failures, holes, violations, deficiencies, and flows 
can have a difficult time accommodating accidents that seem to emerge from normal 
people doing normal work in normal organizations,” [23].  Dekker refers to the idea of 
“normal people doing normal work in normal organizations” as the banality-of-accidents, 
alluding to the fact that most accidents caused by human factors are not due to sabotage 
or deviance, but rather a scarcity of resources and pressure from outside forces.  Shortly 
before the accident, Comair had recently been purchased by Delta, and corporate 
management had demanded wage cuts for the pilots [22].  Nelson states, “Management 
believed that their corporate strategic actions had nothing to do with safety; that people 
would, somehow, leave their personal fears and emotions outside the workplace door and 
remain undistracted while doing their job, even when those distracting fears and emotions 
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were propagated by management inside the workplace.”   Management must be aware 
that outside forces can drive system hazards when human factors are involved. 
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Chapter 5: Additional System Safety Topics for Engineering Managers 
When considering system safety, the ideal goal is to develop and operate systems 
free of hazards, but this is unachievable given the fact that most complex systems are 
inherently hazardous [16].  Examples include the STS, commercial aircraft, and nuclear 
power plants.  Additionally, these systems are operated and maintained by humans, 
considered an integral part of the system, and as such are subject to human error.  
Development and operation of complex systems is a balance between realized benefits 
and associated risk.  Ericson describes safety as analogous to life in that it is a matter of 
knowing, identifying, and controlling risk [16].  Systems safety provides safety 
engineering managers a means of identifying, managing, and mitigating hazard risk.  It is 
up to engineering managers to interpret the system safety data and determine the accepted 
level of risk for a given project or application.      
It is easy to lose sight of safety when constrained by cost and performance goals, 
but the cost of a safety related mishap could significantly outweigh the costs of a 
comprehensive and uncompromising safety plan.  For instance, an organization with a 
5% profit margin would have to have sales of $500,000 to pay for a $25,000 mishap.  
Safety must be engrained into the organization at all levels and considered as a design 
metric just like cost and performance.  To achieve this goal engineering managers must 
understand the hierarchical structure of safety control and the effect of organizational 




5.1 HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF SAFETY CONTROL 
 To gain an understanding of how engineering managers can affect system safety, 
dissection of the safety control hierarchy is necessary.  Recall, safety controls are the 
measures in place that either reduce or mitigate the risk of a mishap.  Whereas, the 
hierarchical structure of safety control represents the flow of constraints from the top 
levels of the project organizational structure through to the lower levels.  It also illustrates 
the connections between system development and system operations.  Figure 8 is the 
general form of the hierarchical structure of Socio-Technical Control [24].  Socio-
technical refers to the social constraints and technical constraints that exist within a 
project.  The system safety process must address both factors.  Nancy Leveson, professor 
of Aeronautics and Astronautics at MIT, has developed this generalized model to 
illustrate the need for clear communication between levels to achieve a safe system.  
    The left side of the hierarchical structure shown in Figure 8 represents system 
development while the right side represents system operations.  It can be seen that the 
structure covers the entire life cycle of the project from inception through manufacturing 
and into operations.  At the top of each side lies Congress and Legislatures because the 
laws and regulations that governments set will have a profound effect on system design.  
With the case of NASA, the government dictates the programs that the agency will 
pursue and allocates funding.  On both sides of the hierarchy there is a connection 
between government legislation and government regulatory agencies.  One example of a 
government regulatory agency is the Federal Aviation Administration that dictates many 
aircraft design and operational requirements, many of them with regard to safety such as 
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procedures for aircraft operations.  Company management is the next step down the 
hierarchical chain of requirements.  Management sets the safety policies and standards 
that the project and operations manager’s must follow, and allocates resources for the 
project.  This is management’s first responsibility with respect to safety in the hierarchy, 
but it can be seen that project management, manufacturing management, and operations 
management all have a responsibility of taking applicable laws and regulations in 
account.  What is necessary to maintain a safe system really goes beyond what is required 
by law, though.  It begins with the organizational culture that is present within the firm, 




Figure 8: Hierarchical Structure of Socio-Technical Control [24]  
 
5.2 THE INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ON SYSTEM SAFETY 
Following the Challenger accident many safety measures were put into place to 
ensure that outside influences could not drive another launch under unsafe conditions.  
However, in 1995 a Space Shuttle Management Review Team found that “a myriad of 
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safety requirements levied on customers…have a significant impact on the design and 
integration…[5].”  Under this premise the team recommended that NASA “restructure 
and reduce overall safety, reliability, and quality assurance elements” [5].  After 
experiencing the Columbia accident it is obvious that the team was under a false 
perception of risk.  The question is what drives management to make such decisions 
when in hindsight they are clearly flawed?  One answer is that the evolution of the 
organizational culture within the company clouds the judgment of management and 
drives irrational decisions.   
In the early days of NASA, the organization was called upon to complete what 
were thought to be impossible tasks.  Because of this NASA had to become a “high-
performance government organization” capable to rising to the challenges it faced [25].  
For all intents and purposes, NASA was very successful in the early days of space flight 
with the completion of the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs without losing any 
astronauts on a space flight mission.  However, as with all government organizations, 
NASA started to become excessively bureaucratic and their employees began to resist 
new ideas [25].  The obvious troubles with the Space Shuttle are not the only issues 
NASA has experienced over the past two decades.  There was the Orbiting Carbon 
Observatory satellite that failed to reach orbit due to a problem with the payload fairing 
in 2009, the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology space craft that 
collided with the rendezvous satellite in 2005, the Genesis space craft whose parachutes 
failed to deploy and crashed into the earth in 2004, the Mars Polar Lander that crashed 
into the surface of Mars in 1999, and the Deep Space 2 penetrator space craft that failed 
in 1999.  According to a study by Howard McCurdy, the decline in NASA can be 
attributed to the organizational culture of the company.  Early on NASA had an adaptive 
culture that supported high levels of performance [25].  One of the main reasons for this 
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success was that employees were empowered to make decisions and use their own 
discretion when faced with technical challenges.  As the organizational culture changed 
the ensuing bureaucracy made it impossible for engineers to have the same flexibility.  
This inevitably resulted in missed milestones, increased cost, and mission failure on 
numerous occasions.   
Engineering managers must be cognizant of how cultural norms within the 
company affect the “big three” of project and systems engineering management, 
schedule, cost, and performance.  However, these three measures of a project cannot be 
looked at independently of safety.  Through policy changes and standard company 
practices management can influence culture to include safety as a driving factor 
throughout the life-cycle of the project.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
System safety was introduced shortly after World War II due to public concerns 
over safety in the nuclear power, aviation, and chemical industries.  It evolved over the 
years and eventually took its current form in MIL-STD-882D.  Since its inception in 
1969, MIL-STD-882 has been the main carrier of advancements in system safety and 
serves as the basis for most modern system safety plans.  The rapid technological 
advancements in the modern era require management to create and diligently follow a 
system safety plan that exudes the following basic principles [7]: 
1. System safety is built into the design, and not implemented as an afterthought 
2. System safety deals with the entire system and not just it components or 
subsystems 
3. System safety looks beyond failure based hazards and attempts to identify all 
hazards inherent in the system 
4. System safety relies on analysis rather than experience and standards 
5. System safety uses a qualitative approach 
6. System safety recognizes tradeoffs and conflicts 
7. System safety is not just system engineering 
System safety principles can be applied to any technology driven product, or 
process, comprising complex integrated facets.  It is a systematic scientific approach that 
engineers use to characterize the risk of potential hazards.  Management plays a large role 
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in system safety, and the prevention of safety related accidents.  The science of system 
safety provides a structured guideline for managers to follow in order to ensure safe 
operations, but it does not ensure against deviations from such guidelines.  This 
responsibility lies with management.  Management, in this case refers to all levels of 
management including top management, project management, functional management, 
and systems engineering management. 
Engineering managers must be able to track safety throughout product 
development, deployment, and operation.  This is achieved by treating system safety as 
an integrated engineering discipline within the SE model.  However, most organizations 
have a separate safety group that evaluates proposed designs and identifies areas where 
safety is an issue.  With this approach it is very difficult to build safety into the design 
and technical teams are often called upon to make design changes late into the program.  
The result is increased design complexity and, in almost all cases, cost overruns.  
Additionally, identified hazards and residual risk are not easily tracked and maintained as 
the program ages.  Following the Columbia accident, NASA took control of the STS 
hazards away from the safety group and placed it into the hands of the technical teams 
because they realized the hazards were not being maintained properly [3].  It is not 
feasible to expect the technical teams to integrate safety into the design unless it is 
considered a design metric just as cost and performance.   
 The system safety process consists of eight steps with topics including 
development of a system safety plan, identification of system hazards, risk assessment 
and management throughout the product life cycle, and tracking of hazards and residual 
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risk during operations.  It is impossible to design systems free of hazards so it is crucial 
that the entire team understands the safety requirements up front so safety can be built 
into the design and not treated as an afterthought.  Fielding a safe system also depends on 
management’s ability to communicate risk with the technical team, and the proper 
allocation of resources with respect to system safety.  Proper communication of risk 
requires the CSE and PM to be in tune with lessons learned from previous projects.  In 
order to ensure that the allocation of resources towards safety is sufficient, management 
must develop a clear and comprehensive safety plan during the planning stage of the 
project and not after a design exists.  The plan must consider hazards not only at the 
component and sub-system levels but also at the integrated system level.  Ideally, the plan 
should be intertwined with the overall system engineering process so that safety 
requirements drive design just as cost and performance do.  NASA has become aware of 
this fact as evidenced in the latest version of the NASA General Safety Requirements 
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